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ABSTRACT 
11 
This study uses accounting based measures to draw implication regarding the 
performance of the acquired firms. The results are reported based on the 
average of the five years before and after the takeover. This study has shown 
that the acquisition of public listed companies did not result in improvement 
in the earning performance after the takeover. In contrast to the actual 
performance of the companies. the investor S perception on the value of the 
target increased. The decline in earning performance ratio could be explained 
by the fact that all the takeovers sample except one are of a conglomerate 
type. Secondly. most of these acquisitions have been financed by the issue of 
shares by the bidder to the target s shareholders. resulting in dilution on earning 
performance. 
ABSTRAK 
Objektif kajian adalah untuk melihat ukuran yang berasaskan perakaunan 
supaya rumusan boleh dibuat mengenai prestasi firma yang lelah diambilalih. 
Keputusan dilaporkan berasaskan purata 5 lahun sebelum dan selepas 
diamhilalih. Kajian ini menunjukkan pengambilalihan syarikat tersenarai 
tidak meningkatkan prestasi perolehannya setelah diambilalih. Berlainan 
dengan prestosi sebenar syarikat. pelabur-pelabur bertanggapan peningkatan 
nilai pada syarikat sasaran. Penurunan nisbah prestasi perolehan boleh 
diterangkan oleh sampel syarikat sasaran yang kesemuanya kecuali satu 
merupakan jenis syarikat konglomerat. Kedua. kesemua pengambilan dibiayai 
mela/ui pemberian saham oleh syarikat penawar kepada pemegang saham 
syarikat sasaran menyebabkan kecairan prestasi perolehannya. 
INTRODUCTION 
Any theoretical analysis of acquisition involves an examination of the reasons 
and effects of acquisition. Firms can obtain operational as well as financial 
benefits attributed to acquisition. Dale (1973) uses five main rationales of 
gro\\1h by acquisition, which include lengthening the product line, gaining 
shares in a market not previously supplied, enlarging a firm's capacity to supply 
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old markets, diversifying interests and acquiring access to further process or 
distribution facilities. According to Dale, generally purely financial gains are 
merely accompanied by an acquisition and are not a reason for affecting it. 
The shareholder's wealth maximization theory requires that a takeover or 
merger leads to increased profitability for the bidders as well as the target 
firms in order for the merger and takeover to be justified, notably from synergy; 
either from financial, operational or managerial synergy. 
FINANCIAL SYNERGY 
Financial synergy results in the ability to take advantage from each other's 
financial positions. It either results in lower cost of capital, cost of debt, a 
greater debt capacity, or a higher price-earnings ratio. Gains in terms of 
financial synergy are more in line with Mueller's neoclassical theories (1977). 
Investing in unrelated businesses will also lower the systematic risk of a 
company's investment portfolio. The increased size of the firm will give it 
access to cheaper capital and reduce the probability of bankruptcy. As a result, 
lenders are willing to lend more to the combined entity than to the companies 
separately. 
Financial synergy also results in the tax benefit of an acquisition to the 
bidding firm which depends on the tax status of the target firm, or vice-versa. 
A firm with a large cumulative tax·loss may have little prospect of earning in 
the future to utilise fully its tax loss carry forward. By merging with any firm 
with sufficient earnings, it may be possible for the surviving firm to fully utilise 
the valuable tax deduction from the loss carry forward. Another situation is 
where the acquisition may derive tax benefit from unused tax depreciation and 
investment tax credit. Finally there may exist the situation where the combined 
firm is more highly leveraged, thus reducing its tax bill. However, these 
econom ic gains cannot be realised by either company if each remains as separate 
entity as in the case of most acquisition in Malaysia. 
OPERATIONAL SYNERGY 
Operational synergy results from economies of scale in production and 
distribution. Haley and Schall (1979) note that this operational synergy has a 
direct effect on income and cash investment since the combined firms can 
produce more cheaply (lower expense) or sell the product more efficiently 
(higher revenue), or that the investment is greater since the merged firms can 
acquire capital equipment more cheaply or embark on a highly profitable 
investment programme which raises income more than investment. The attempt 
by the bidding firm to secure control of the target firm and implement an 
operating strategy will increase the value of both firms. By their nature, these 
economies are available to related acquisitions as sources of value creation, 
and not to unrelated acquisition. Thus, in the case of conglomerate mergers, 
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mergers involving firms with unrelated business activities, operational is less 
evident. 
MANAGERIAL SYNERGY 
Managerial synergy results when the bidder's manager posesses superior 
planning and monitoring abilities that benefit the target's performance. The 
cost of managing a large diversified firm, resulting from the formation of 
conglomerate especially, will substantially reduce relative to operating 
economies. 
Mueller (1969), however, notes that the synergistic effects of merger will take 
place only when they produce some increase in market power, or when they 
produce a technological or managerial economy of scale. But, in conglomerate 
merger, most of the theoretical literature of finance has assumed no synergy, 
except for financial effects [Copeland and Weston (1988»). The financial 
possibilities include taking advantage of transient errors in the market valuation 
of acquisition candidates, utilising the unused debt capacity of an acquired 
firm subsequent to merger, or simply obtaining a diminished variability of 
total corporate earnings through the portfolio diversification implied by 
conglomeration [Lewellen (1971»). 
AGENCY THEORY 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) have developed a comprehensive theory of agency 
costs. They show that the principals, i.e the stockholders, can assume that the 
agent (manager) will make optimal decisions only if appropriate incentives 
are given, and only if the agent is monitored. Thus, the separation of ownership 
and control in a corporation will give rise to so-called agency cost. It reflects 
the economic losses to shareholders when management does not act in the 
shareholders' best interests - i.e the maximisation of the market value of the 
owners' equity. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the value of the firm reflects a 
valuation by shareholders to include the value perquisites consumed by the 
managers as the agents of the shareholders. In other words, they suggest that 
top management remuneration should reflect organisation performance and 
shareholders' return. Fama (1980) suggests that the primary monitoring of 
managers comes not from the owners but from the managerial labour market. 
If the managerial labour market is competitive both within and outside the 
firm, it will tend to discipline the manager. The market for corporate control, 
a major component of the managerial labor market, and often referred to as 
the takeover, is the arena in which alternative management teams compete for 
the right to manage corporate resources [Jensen and Ruback (1983»). Jensen 
(1988) pictures takeovers as a disciplinary force in the capital market which 
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functions as a market for corporate control. He argues that, the market for 
corporate control is creating large benefits for shareholders and for the economy 
as a whole by loosening control vast amount of resources and enabling them 
to move to their 'highest-value use'. He also describes 'free cash flow' in 
explaining various aspects of takeover. Free cash flow is defined as cash flow 
in excess of that required to fund all of a firm's project that have positive net 
present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital. Managers who 
invest in projects with negative net present value or waste it through 
organisation inefficiency instead of paying the excess cash flow to their 
shareholders are threatened by competing management teams. The 
conglomerate firm of an organisation therefore offers the potential for an 
organisation solution to a reduction in the magnitude of the owner-agent 
problem; that is, the corporate level or holding company management can 
effectively monitor the management of the individual firm within the 
conglomerate. 
Empirical test of the various themes of corporate takeovers found in the 
Finance literature utilises the event study methodology almost exclusively. 
The event study involves calculating the 'abnormal' return on the shares of 
common stock for the affected firm as the difference in the actual returns and 
the expected returns. These abnormal returns are then averaged across all the 
firms in relation to 'event time'. The evidence from the above theories can 
then be indirectly inferred from merger customers. 
Fauzias (1993) used event study analysis to measure the effects of 
acquisition, specifically the effects of acquisition announcement on the price 
behaviour of Malaysian bidders and target firms. The results of her study 
show that target firms experience a decline prior to the leakage of information 
and that the bidding firms is assumed to be motivated by information on the 
efficiency of the target firm. Her study also implies that an investor in the 
target and bidder firm is capable of outperforming the market before the 
acquisition announcement date. During the announcement period for both 
target and bidder and the post announcement period for the target, it can only 
earn a normal return. The immediate post acquisition announcement for the 
bidder on the other hand, indicates that it earns a negative return instead. The 
results ofthis study appear to indicate that bidders' managers might not act to 
maximise shareholders' wealth, although further research is needed to confirm 
this behaviour. They might also over estimate the value of the gains which 
might result from paying too much for the target's results. 
Although the accounting based measures do not take into account risk, 
it continues to be an important contribution to our understanding of performance 
implication. Therefore, it is the objective of this study to look at the accounting 
based measure to draw implication regarding the performance of the acquired 
firms and try to answer whether acquisition results in the creation of economic 
value. 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The data were collected from the companies' announcement and notice of 
takeover filed with the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), annual reports 
of each company and KLSE handbooks. Data collected include prices of shares 
both high and low, net profit, paid up capital, gross profit, interest on long 
term liabilities, retained earnings, total current liabilities, long term liabilities 
. and total reserves. 
The above data were collected for each acquired listed firm for the five 
years before and five years after the takeover. It was decided that, where the 
takeover was completed near the end of the financial year, the financial data 
representing the last year before the takeover, include those of that year. For 
example, if the takeover was in October for a company with a financial year-
end in December, then the financial results for the last year under the old 
management, included the year it was taken over. Similarly, if the takeover 
was completed near the beginning of the financial year, then the financial 
results for the first year under the new management would be the year it was 
taken over. Only publicly listed Malaysian acquired companies whose chief 
executive officer andlor a majority of its Board members have substantially 
changed were selected, to better reflect the performance of the respective 
management pre and post takeover. A total of7 acquired firms meet the above 
requirement from the initial sample of 19 acquired firms. 
The comparison of the difference in earning performance ofthe acquired 
firms before and after the takeover as a measure of efficiency gains are 
determined by earning per share (EPS), return on equity (ROE), return on capital 
employed (ROCE), and return on total assets (ROTA). These are determined by 
the following formula; 
Net Profit 
EPS (1) 
Number of Shares Issued 
Earning before interest and tax 
EBITOTA = (2) 
Total assets 
Net Profit 
ROE (3) 
Shareholders' Fund 
Gross Profit + Interest On Long Term Liabilities 
ROCE = -------------------------------- (4) 
Total Shareholders' Fund + Long Term Liabilities 
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where, shareholders' Fund is defined as Paid-up 
capital + Capital and Other Reserves + (4a) 
Share Premium Account + Retained Earnings 
Net Profit 
ROTA = (5) 
Total Assets 
The comparison of the difference in the capital structure as a measure 
of financial leverage before and after takeover are determined by the ratio of 
debt and equity (DER), total liabilities to total assets (TLOTA), total liabilities to 
equity (TLOE) and the ratio of long term debt to total assets (LTDOTA). These 
are determined by the following formula; 
Loan term debt + Overdraft + Preferred capital 
DER (6) 
Shareholders' Fund + Minority interest 
Total Liabilities 
TLOTA = (7) 
Total Assets 
Total Liabilities 
TLOE = (8) 
Shareholder's fund 
Total long term debt 
LTDOTA= (9) 
Total Assets 
The comparisons of how the market perceives a firm's growth and 
profit opportunities before and after takeover are determined by multiple of 
earning or price earnings ratio (PIE), multiple of asset or the ratio of market 
value of the firm (equity + debt) to the replacement cost of the firm's assets 
(Tobin's Q), and multiple of book value or market to book value ratio (MTBV). 
These are determined by the following formula; 
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Market price per share 
PIE (10) 
Earnings per share 
Market value of equity + Book value of debt 
Tobin's Q = --------------- (11) 
Book value of assets 
Market price per share 
MTBV (12) 
Book value per share 
The results are reported based on the average of the five years before 
and after the takeover. 
FINDINGS 
Table 1 shows the mean of earning performance before and after takeover. 
For the years after the takeover, all the earnings ratios were significantly lower 
than before the takeover. Return on equity, return on total assets, return on 
capital employed, earning before interest and tax on total assets, and earning 
per share dropped by 50%, 530/0, 460/0, 40% and 44% respectively. The results 
of the these means are plotted on the graphs shown in Figure I and II. This 
finding suggests that takeover did not result in an improvement in the 
performance of the target firms and this is not consistent with the shareholder's 
wealth maximization theory; notably not from the operational synergy and 
managerial economies of scale. 
TABLE 1. Ectrning Perfonnance Before and After Takeover 
Five year earning perfonnance Mean Mean t value 
before after 
ROE 13.80/0 6.9% 2.9685* 
ROTA 8.7% 4.1% 3.6584* 
ROCE 24.5% 13.3% 3.1421 * 
EBITOTA 15.4% 8.3% 3.9685* 
EPS .25 .14 2.8009* 
Notes: * Significant at the S percent level. 
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Table 2 shows the mean of capital structure before and after takeover. 
For the year after the takeover, long term debt to equity ratio was significantly 
higher than before the takeover. The ratio of total long term debt on total 
assets also increased slightly but, significant from 1.7% to 5.40/0. Even though 
total liabilities to total assets and total liabilities to total equity increase from 
36.3% and 64.9% to 37.8% and 74.8% respectively, statistically, they are not 
significant. The results of these means are plotted on the graph shown in 
Figure III. 
An increase in debt to equity ratio and slight increase in debt on total 
assets. imply an increase reliance on debt by the new management. 
TABLE 2. Capital Structure Before and After Takeover 
Five year capital structure Mean Mean t value 
before and after takeover before after 
DER 3.90/0 10.4% -6.55* 
TLOTA 36.3% 37.8% -1.55 
TLOE 64.9% 74.8% -1.69 
LTDOTA 1.7% 5.4% -4.885* 
Notes: * Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Table 3 shows mean of earnings, assets and book value per share 
mUltiples before and after the takeover. For the years after the takeover, all 
the ratios were significantly higher than before the takeover. The price earning 
ratio, Tobin's Q and market to book value increased by 131%, 40% and 128% 
respectively. The results of these means are plotted on the graph shown in 
Figure IV. This suggest that the market perceived the value of the targets 
increased after the takeover. This may also indicate positive reactions on the 
new management by the shareholders of the target. 
TABLE 3: Earning, Assets and Book Value Per Share Multiples Before 
and After Takeover 
Five year earning, Assets and Mean Mean t value 
book value per share multiples before after 
PER 21.1 48.7 -4.17* 
TOBlN'Q 2.5 3.5 -1.93** 
MTBV 1.8 4.1 -3.42* 
Notes: * Significant at the 5 percent level 
*. Significant at the 10 percent level 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This study has shown that the acquisition of a public listed companies did not 
result in improvement in the earning performance after the takeover. In contrast 
to the actual performance of the companies, the investor's perception on the 
value of the target increased. A low debt ratio gives greater capacity of the 
target firm's ability to borrow. With tax deductible interest, increase in debt 
capacity increases the after tax value ofthe firm. However, this finding imply 
an increase reliance on debt by the new management did not produce good 
earning performance, which is not consistent with the financial synergy. 
The decline in earning performance ratio could be explained by the 
fact that all the takeovers except one are of a conglomerate type. By its nature, 
operational synergy and managerial economics of scale are less ,evident in a . 
conglomerate type of merger. In fact it seems that the corporate level or holding 
company management did not effectively monitor the management of the 
individual firm within the conglomerate, or reduce the owner - agent problem 
of the target firms. Nevertheless, the market perception on the value of the 
targets increased after the takeover, indicating the market's positive reactions 
on the new management. Thus, it appears that the investors assessment of 
future prospects of the target firm is higher than its past and actual earning 
performance. The fact that most of these acquisitions have been financed by 
the issue of shares by the bidder to the target's shareholders, it could result in 
dilution on earning performance. Nevertheless, we do believe that the success 
of individual acquisition will depend upon the relative abilities of the new 
management in achieving operational efficiency and for making the shifts in 
their product markets required by the changing economic enviroment as 
professed by Weston and Mansighka (1971) which will then be reflected in its 
actual earning performance and the value of the firm. 
APPE!IIDIX 1. List of Target and Bidder Companies 
TARGET COMPANIES BIDDER COMPANIES 
Name Date of Acquisition Name Types of Merger Method of Payment 
1. Central Sugar 8th January '80 Malayan United Conglomerate Shares and cash 
Bhd (Malayan United 
Industries Bhd 
Manufacturing Bhd) 
. 2. Keramat Tin Bhd 13th June '80 Malayan Tin Horizontal Shares 
Dredging Bhd 
3. Synthetic Resin Bhd 7th Nov '80 Pegi Malaysia Bhd Conglomerate Shares 
(Sateras Resources Bhd) 
4. George Kent Bhd 27th May '81 Johan Holdings Bhd Conglomerate Cash 
5. Dunlop & Estate 15th June '82 Multipurpose Conglomerate Shares and cash 
Bhd Holding Bhd 
6. Dunlop Malaysian 7th March '85 Consolidated Conglomerate Shares 
Industries Bhd plantation Bhd 
7. United Estate 21th Jan '85 Sime Darby Bhd Conglomerate Shares 
Project Bhd 
(Sime-UEP Bhd) 
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